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Abstract 
This contribution is based on a set of reflections presented at the REGov Workshop. These reflections were offered as part of a
synthesis of six thematic panels (Balsiger & Debarbieux, this volume). Additional presentations provided in the context of this
panel include those of Bernard Debarbieux, University of Geneva, and Jörg Balsiger, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
Zurich. Webcasts of all presentations are available at http://www.reg-observatory.org/outputs.html.
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As Director of the Mountain Research Initiative (MRI), I am participating in this conference of political scientists 
and geographers as an outsider but one with the abiding conviction that your community offers insights that 
contribute to an interdisciplinary understanding of mountain social-ecological systems. 
The MRI is a small project funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation as part of the much larger Earth 
System Science Partnership (ESSP). The ESSP is composed of the four main global change research projects 
(International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, International Human Dimensions Programme, World Climate 
Research Programme, and Diversitas). MRI is that small portion of the ESSP community that looks neither at social 
systems nor at ecological systems, but rather at both in a specific environment, that of mountains. The geographic 
focus of MRI is thus matched with an emphasis on interdisciplinary research. 
The MRI arose among German-speaking biophysical researchers in the late 1990s, who nonetheless recognized 
that understanding mountains meant understanding the social component of mountains. They knew that they needed 
social scientists, a statement that MRI still endorses. 
The engagement of social scientists with other researchers on global change in mountain remains, with few 
exceptions, limited. For instance the Consortium for Integrated Climate Science in the Western Mountains 
(CIRMOUNT) runs a wonderful conference (MTNCLIM) every 18 months in the western US. As a group 
CIRMOUNT clearly appreciates the social science perspective – and even has a special session named in memory 
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not of a scientist but of a politically savvy manager: Dennis Machida, formerly of the Tahoe Conservancy– that 
focuses on the interface between science and policy. While that session attracts advocates and operatives, the 
conference itself still fails to attract social scientists. At the global scale, the ESSP community runs the Analysis, 
Integration and Modeling of the Earth System (AIMES) project, which brings together researchers interested in 
complex system analysis. Their work includes social systems by definition and yet social scientists other than 
economists are rare at these meetings.  
Part of the reason for the scarcity of social scientists at such meetings may be that the underlying perspective of 
such communities as CIRMOUNT and AIMES remains, for all their sincere desire for social science, rooted in 
biophysical models of the world. Earth system science seems to treat humans as a very important species with 
biological requirements and impacts. Though not incorrect, this approach seems incomplete. For instance, it does 
not deal at all with how decisions are made within human communities and especially the role of politics and policy, 
processes that I observed up close during the time I spent in California state government. Thus, I am here at this 
conference to understand better the orientation of your community of scholars in hopes of eventually achieving the 
goal of interdisciplinarity enunciated by MRI’s founders. 
I had hoped to contribute to the summary of this conference, but have decided otherwise. It has become clear that 
there is a distinct vocabulary within this community, one that allows the community to operate a kind of algebra. 
This is not unusual within science. The particle physicists at the European Organization for Nuclear Research 
(CERN), for instance, have a very specific vocabulary that uses common words to refer to characteristics of particles 
that are unfathomable to non-physicists. I find myself in a similar situation here. I do not have control of the 
vocabulary of this community and so would appear in your discussions of calculus as someone limited to arithmetic. 
In the absence of such a contribution I would like to offer a few thoughts that have occurred to me during the past 
several days. 
The first has to do with what has been termed here “materiality” – the biology and physical nature of the world. I 
have no problem whatsoever with the notion that political discourse co-opts nature, that it gets invoked to serve 
other ideological ends. But admitting that nature has rhetorical utility is not tantamount to admitting that it has no 
deeper structure. Generations of biologists and earth scientists have devoted their careers to the premise that the 
world is constructed in a particular way and not in another. Similarly, I agree that regions are not natural per se but 
are rather social constructions. However, the existence of watersheds is an incontrovertible physical phenomenon, 
and we should understand that within nature there are many such “-sheds,” geographic manifestations of biophysical 
processes. While their existence does not automatically justify their use in policy, it is nonetheless useful to ask to 
what extent nature’s structures match socially constructed regions. 
What are some of these key natural structures? I think that it is safe to say that distinct species exist, and that they 
have distinct habitat requirements, even if we still do not know fully what those requirements are. If we value 
species and do not wish them to go extinct, then it is important to know those requirements. For decades the habitat 
requirements and therefore the range of species, particularly of the northern spotted owl and of the bewildering array 
of anadromous salmonids, have imposed a bioregional scale on the multiple jurisdictions of the Pacific Northwest of 
the USA, requiring in the end the involvement of the Office of the President to address these issues. 
Watersheds are clearly important both physically and socially. The lack of coherence between the spaces defined 
by gravity's pull on liquid water and the organization of human society imposes great administrative costs on 
societies (e.g., river treaties) and has been a long-standing subject for research. Carbon similarly structures spaces, 
with source areas (e.g., melting permafrost releasing methane) and sinks (e.g. growing forests). As carbon becomes 
increasingly important in the management of the planet, it is reasonable to expect that the spatial location of sources 
and sinks and the flows between them will enter more into the discourse on regions and governance. Legacies, such 
as the mercury used to capture gold in the sluices of the California gold rush era, similarly define "-sheds" that must 
be confronted by governance. And so on. 
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So materiality matters. I postulate that materiality will matter even more in the future. This is where history, a 
topic even more contested than materiality, enters the picture. Many ESSP researchers assert that we are now in the 
Anthropocene, a new era of history in which the human species acts as a planetary force. It is never a bad idea to see 
what purposes such rhetoric serves, but in this case I will look the other way, that is, toward the accuracy of the idea 
itself. It seems reasonable that given a global human population that has increased seven fold since 1800 with 
roughly half of the increase in the past 50 years does history, and a 40-fold increase in global GDP over this same 
period, human kind is exerting a tremendous impact on the planet. And while it does not ineluctably follow that 
humans are depleting the earth’s resources, it seems very plausible that there is much less “slack” in the system. Not 
only are there a lot more people with stakes in nature now, but the nature and diversity of those stakes have 
increased. In the context again of California, at the time of the Gold Rush in 1849, perhaps only a few resources 
beyond gold itself were of interest, and as a result, the rules of the game favored mining. Thirty years later, the 
population and economy of California has grown to such an extent that industrial scale mining was perceived by a 
part of the population as creating a nuisance, and in a precedent-setting decision in 1884, the court ruled that 
hydraulic mining must cease. Over the next 125 years the population of California has grown enormously and with 
it the variety of resources and values posited in nature by that population. Today it is safe to say that virtually every 
part of the state matters to someone. More to the point, every part of the state now matters to more than one person 
and for different reasons. Understanding the operation of such an interconnected system of values and stakes poses a 
great challenge to social science. 
I have been impressed in this conference by the amount of institutional innovation that seems to be emerging in 
response to this proliferation of human-nature and human-human interactions. As a biologist, I understand this 
innovation largely in the light of evolution.  
This is not as great a stretch as you might think. Institutions are a central part of the human life history strategy in 
that they both permit and regulate access to key resources needed for survival. While other species have anatomical 
adaptations that allow them to access resources (as do we as well), humans, as social primates, nearly always 
employ some kind of institutional arrangement as well. While it may seem odd to equate a government agency, 
common property rules, or a treaty with the beak of a bird, in the end they serve a similar function: to allow the 
species to persist in the face of both external challenges and internal tradeoffs. 
An evolutionary argument then postulates that, like anatomy, institutional arrangements are under selective 
pressure, that some institutional arrangements are less fit than others and that over time these drop out of the life 
history strategy, leaving only those that work better. Stewart Kauffman (1993) characterizes this evolutionary 
process using three notions.  
First, there is a domain of sets of traits, which in our case are sets of alternative institutional arrangements. 
Perhaps a good example for this situation is the alternative institutional solutions embodied in the negotiating text of 
an environmental treaty. Different actors propose different, partially mutual exclusive solutions, and together they 
form a set of alternatives. 
Second, there is the range of fitness values associated with each set of traits. While it might seem preposterous to 
attempt to calculate a priori how well a given institutional arrangement might work, it is far more reasonable to 
assume that one can assess a posteriori if a given institutional arrangement did work, simply because it has persisted 
within the institutional genome of the society. Put another way, most would agree that there is a relationship 
between a given institutional arrangement and its outcome, even if we cannot yet predict it. A key idea here is that 
small changes in the institutional arrangements can lead to great differences in fitness. In Kauffman’s terms, the 
fitness surface is not a smooth surface with a single optimum but rather a rugged surface with many local optima. 
Third, evolution consists of mutation, that is, the creation in our case of a new institutional arrangement, with its 
own new fitness value, and then selection, which allows only the higher fitness values to persist in the population. 
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While this model might seem terribly abstruse, it was in fact the only perspective that allowed me to make sense 
of the political and policy making process that I observed in California. Mutation and selection happened every day, 
all the time: new ideas, new arrangements, new deals were constantly bombarding the policy-making actors who 
embody the fitness surface. And as with genes, very few of these mutations made their way through the selective 
process of politics into the current institutional arrangements of the society. But some did.  
Obviously, how one characterizes fitness is central to this perspective. There is an easy, if not terribly satisfying, 
answer in that that which persists is by definition fit. By a similar logic, that which persists can also be said to be 
sustainable. This is exactly how Walter Firey (1960) structured his inquiry in Men, Mind and Land: let us look for 
natural resource systems that persisted and then analyze why they did so. In terms of the evolutionary perspective 
Firey was attempting to understand the function that calculates the fitness of institutions. As I remember it, he found 
it to be composed of the creation of wealth, the conservation of the underlying ecosystem and what he called 
“likelihood,” the congruence of the institution with the broader culture. In a similar way, Elinor Ostrom’s on-going 
study of common property regimes emphasizes those ecological and institutional characteristics of common 
property regimes that have persisted (Ostrom, 2009). While Firey’s work provided a theoretical basis for 
sustainability, Ostrom provides more concrete guidance about necessary institutional components.  
I applaud the empirical drive of this community. New data are always the best source of new ideas. I do 
nonetheless beat the drum for some kind of theory that provides a context for those data and which can be disproved 
by such data. As a result of my particular career path and the general observation that human beings are finally 
biological beings, evolutionary theory works for me. Maybe my deeper message here is the need for theory, 
evolutionary or otherwise, to make sense of the diversity of institutional arrangements we find in the world. 
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